'Even within democratic governments, NGOs in the democracies, and academia, there has been relatively little reflection on the process of ousting dictators and the need for plans and action' .
Introduction
'Autocracies' and autocratic rule are words that have wide currency in debates about the progress of democratising trends around the world, delineating a particular category of political regime that is widely thought to be in retreat. The 'third wave' of democracy in the 1980s and the early 1990s and a more recent groundswell of political change displayed by the 'rose', 'orange' and 'cedar' revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Lebanon have all contributed to this impression. As more countries move some way along the pathways of political liberalisation and democratisation so the attention of democracy promotion actors in the international community, who have proliferated and expanded their activities in the last two decades or so, now begins to turn to the group of outstanding cases, the 'non-transitions'. This is illustrated nowhere more vividly than in Ambassador Palmer ' However, just as the very mixed record of democratization among those countries that have embarked on political change confirms the complexity of the challenge, so it underscores the realisation that there is no inevitability about successful autocratic opening to democracy. Understanding how autocratic opening might be brought about seems at one and the same time to be both more pressing and more difficult. This paper argues that the different sources of domestic legitimacy autocracies may enjoy and the different vulnerabilities these can give rise to, deserve more thought than the attention they have hitherto received, not least for the implications for constructive engagement by democracy promotion actors in the international community.
Distinguishing the autocracies
As a political concept 'autocracy' is actually rather poorly defined. The Oxford English Dictionary calls it 'absolute government by one person', which is much narrower than the rather loose way 'autocracies' have come to be cited in contemporary political debate. Moreover even individual despots rule by virtue of the acquiescence and connivance of others: at minimum they need the support of the praetorian guard, as the philosopher David Hume writing in the eighteenth century observed. Autocrats might claim there are no formal constraints on their authority, but de facto power is never unlimited, especially in today's increasingly interdependent world where increasing amounts of polycentric or multi-level governance encroach on state power and national sovereignty. Furthermore, not only do definitions that emphasise individual rulers distract attention from the autocracies' system of rule, but they fail to recognise important differences over claims about the right to rule on the one side and on the other side cases where no such right at all is claimed -that is, where the autocrats' power enjoys no legitimacy at all, and rests solely on force and fear.
The many references to autocracies in current discourse betray no single or 'true' meaning, although there is a purely etymological account that can be traced back to the ancient Greek philosophers. That said, autocracies can be understood as political regimes where competitive political participation is sharply restricted or suppressed and the power-holders reserve a right to determine the rights and freedoms everyone else enjoys, while being largely free from institutional constraints 2 3 themselves. 2 In a fundamental sense such claims to arbitrary or unlimited power mean the ruled must be unfree, even if in practice the people are permitted some liberties to a certain degree, for example some economic freedoms, at the autocrat's discretion. Situating 'autocracy' towards the 'hard' end of the scale of authoritarian rule not only captures much general usage of the term but, compared to the dictionary definition is less likely to be a fairly empty category in practice. Of course some, perhaps arbitrary decision must draw the boundary with less hard types of authoritarianism; and the literature's invention of terms for 'diminished forms of autocracy' such as 'limited autocracy', 'semi-autocracy', and 'liberalised autocracy' do complicate the picture. Nevertheless it should be possible to separate out the autocracies from both democracies and 'diminished forms of democracy' -the 'hybrid' regimes that share some democratic with some authoritarian characteristics.
To identify which states are the autocracies a pragmatic response would be to use the information supplied by Polity datasets, Freedom House scores and the like.
For example the non-profit, Washington DC-based and in part US government-funded organisation Freedom House, which regards international democracy promotion as its core business, claims to measure freedom and its absence (not levels of democracy).
However its annual surveys, which employ a scale of 1 = most free to 7 = least free, are cited widely in the democratisation literature. The number of existing autocracies is sensitive to where we set the threshold level for autocracy. For example if it is a 'double six' or higher (at minimum a score of 6 for civil liberties and 6 for political rights ) then Freedom House's survey for 2004 would place 23 countries as autocracies. Lowering the threshold to capture all states that Freedom House itself styles 'not free' (a minimum score of 11 for rights and liberties combined) more than doubles the number of autocracies, to 49, which is not far short of the number of 'partly free' states (54). 3 Variations of this nature that owe to where we draw the line can impact on the common or distinctive patterns we then detect and that autocracies are found to share as a group.
Variety of autocracies and domestic legitimacy
The the international system, with or without resort to coercion, threats or payments. 5 The presence of China and its overall displacement in the group of autocracies makes the overall picture look more diverse in some major respects, but certain features that are generally found in autocracies (without being common to all) such as poverty and great inequality are not exclusive to autocracies. Moreover they do not necessarily preclude favourable scores for freedom and democracy: India, often called 'the world's largest democracy' and rated free by Freedom House illustrates the point.
In terms of the political system, most especially the route by which the chief executive is determined, it is conventional to distinguish between personalistic dictatorship, sometimes referred to as sultanism 6 and absolute monarchs, which come closest to autocracy in the dictionary sense (best exemplified among the Gulf states), de jure one-party states and military or military-backed regimes. These distinctions and their importance to the nature and prospects of transition to consolidated democracy are widely understood. However, no less significant is that autocracies differ also in regard to how much domestic legitimacy they enjoy -the regime's 4 5 acceptance by significant sections of society as legitimate authority -and just as important, in the legitimising source of their authority -how they legitimate their rule.
Many autocracies can -do -enjoy some measure of legitimacy among social groups or strata even while they may possess no legitimacy at all among other subjects, a fact that is conveniently overlooked by much present day talk of democracy as a 'world value' Such ethnocentric claims about the absolute appeal of democracy and reference to widespread recognition of the imperative to clothe claims to political authority in language reminiscent of democracy, however bogus or strained, should not lead us to ignore the alternatives that continue to bestow some stability on some autocratic regimes -however puzzling or unappealing most people in the established liberal democracies might find them. This is potentially significant to exploring pathways out of autocracy and deliberating the role that democracy promotion actors in the international community might play. 'Electoral autocracy', where popular 'consent' is expressed through plebiscites and/or an electoral process that is hardly free and fair ('rigged election autocracy') or is incapable of disturbing the top power-holders even though the procedures on election day might pass certain international tests, is another and well populated category. As has been argued in the case of Jordan for example, even a non-fraudulent electoral process that is incapable of producing alternation in the real seat of executive power can serve to lend support to a regime. 7 It can be meaningful in terms of buttressing regime claims to legitimacy. Finally in terms of domestic sources there is 'performance legitimacy' -meeting or presiding over fulfilment of societal needs and desires such as material welfare and personal security. This can count for a lot, Finally, today's autocracies differ over when and how they came to be autocratic. In China there is a distinct political tradition going back centuries, whereas in some of the other countries statehood has been enjoyed for less than 50
years. Although such considerations might affect the possibilities for autocratic opening to democracy now, the 'causes' that illuminate an autocracy's persistence will not necessarily coincide with the historical reasons explaining its origins, where subjugation and oppression at the hands of colonial masters and a legacy from by the variety and plasticity of legitimating sources. Exactly the same finding could apply to explaining autocratic opening. And while autocratic variety might be considered problematic from the perspective of general theory-building aimed at making predictions, its advantage is that certain pathways to change that look unfeasible in some autocracies might be more viable in some others. Where diversity implies the need for more than one explanation, so there could be plural ways in which autocracies start to undergo change, especially with the 'encouragement' of international actors. It is in these circumstances that the relevance of legitimacy comes to the fore, as will be argued after first commenting briefly on the idea of autocratic opening. Theories of path dependence tell us that previous regime characteristics and the manner of its opening will impact on what happens next. Certainly, the factors that produce autocratic opening may well not seal democratic transition and are unlikely to be sufficient to consolidate democracy or guarantee improvements in its quality thereafter. If autocratic opening occurs in a way that destroys the state, through bankruptcy or physical destruction (perhaps because the state was targeted as the route to making the regime vulnerable or the state was already very weak, or regime and state were so indistinguishable that opening the regime inevitably had dire consequences for the state), then the final outcome will be hard to predict. The sequencing of developments can be critical. For instance, without the existence-inwaiting of something like political parties that can organise, channel, and control the expression of popular demands then the collapse of an ancien regime may give way to 8 9 disorder, which in turn allows elements hostile to democracy ('uncivil' social forces, or populist demagogues, and the like) to take control of events. 10 Iraq at the present time looks like a strong candidate. Moreover the outcome of attempted opening and its longer term survival will be contingent in part on the legitimacy that is garnered by the successor regime (whatever its type) and on how claims about legitimacy are affected by the manner of regime replacement, including the impact of international intervention (a complicating factor in Iraq especially).
Autocratic opening

Legitimacy matters
'Opening sustained' is preferable to 'opening lost' but what can make it happen? A fairly safe generalisation is that the importance of agency has gained increasing recognition in studies of democratic 'transition', and that the significance of structural conditions to sustaining democratisation in the longer term, especially socio-economic conditions, retains strong credibility too. At all times structural features -themselves in part the product of agency -will influence contingent choice to some degree.
Further to that generalisation, distinctions which offer useful analytical purchase include those between conditions that make opening possible ('facilitating conditions') and conditions that predispose or make it more likely to happen ('promotional conditions'). The distinctions between conditions/requisites and preconditions/prerequisites, between underlying conditions (or preconditions) and catalysts or 'precipitating factors' ('proximate cause', or 'triggers'), as well as between necessary and sufficient conditions are also very familiar. However, it is probably unavoidable that different theoretical persuasions will subsume the same pieces of evidence under different headings, with one 'school' or theoretical tendency, historical materialism for instance, labelling as a primary cause what another claims are merely predisposing conditions. However, any ahistorical or uniform theories of change would benefit from investigating whether the circumstances which merely predispose to autocratic opening in one country at a particular point in time could be more potent in some other countries. In fact a growing acknowledgment of the international dimensions of democratisation suggests that external judgments of regime legitimacy may now carry more weight than perhaps at any previous time, although external actors can probably play a more decisive role in transitional stages than the long haul afterwards -when a society's firm commitment (or lack of) to 9 10 democratic values makes all the difference. But even then, external factors have the power to damage democratic prospects, for instance by frustrating economic development. Thus one possibility is that influencing factors, international or otherwise, may exert an asymmetrical influence: the greater potential of external actors to unmake than to create sustainable opening to democracy may be a leading example.
One factor that much recent discourse has tended to overlook in all of this is the autocratic regimes' claims to legitimacy. This bears witness to how far the idea that democracy is a universal value has become the conventional wisdom in the West.
But the view that all right thinking people want to give it priority, with the only exceptions being megalomaniacs and their cynically self-interested acolytes is too simplistic. Moreover by failing to distinguish the different claims to legitimacy and their effectiveness among the autocracies, it fails to give sufficient weight to the different vulnerabilities (and differences in the extent of vulnerability) to which those claims can and sometimes do give rise. This is crucially important from the perspective of 'contentious collective action' directed at changing the regime from within society. 11 For example whereas a 'dear leader's' deep personal unpopularity or a time of leadership succession may both create a crisis for personalistic dictatorship these difficulties should be less evident for rule by a military junta or the hegemony of institutional one-party rule. The tensions that can exist between a desire to rule and the commitment to professional military values which may sometimes cause even a military government to weaken, and the way that one-party rule in communist Central-Eastern Europe was hollowed out by mass indifference and defections among the public, do not refute the point. In contrast, electoral autocracies that have or are about to introduce elections may miscalculate the chances of an autocrat being able to retain power even in a 'rigged' ballot (of course the denouement may not come immediately in one single 'electoral revolution' but could take two or even three successive elections). This is especially so where the rigging is widely judged to be so extravagant and so blatant as to delegitimate the electoral outcome, the process and the regime (as in Georgia's 'rose revolution', for example).
Autocracies that survive largely on the basis of dispensing patronage, however, will be more than usually exposed to a sudden dramatic shrinkage in the resources at their disposal, especially if it begins to hurt the autocrats' 'winning coalition' -the social groups who have benefited the most and provide the main source of political support.
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The different sources of legitimacy and their vulnerabilities are significant not just for what they might tell us about the exit routes from autocracy but because of the implications for how democracy promotion actors in the international community could seek to become involved.
International 'intervention'
International intervention of various sorts in the furtherance of both democracy and human rights has increased dramatically over the last fifteen years. The stakeholders in this 'industry' include both governmental and inter-governmental actors and a host of (quasi-)non-governmental actors too, for instance the specially created democracy foundations, funded by governments (like Britain's Westminster Foundation for Democracy), and the activities of Germany's political foundations that are affiliated to that country's political parties. 12 For many of them the chances of influencing particular institutions, policies and specific behaviours to an extent that falls well short of autocratic opening have to be rated much more highly than securing 'Electoral autocracies' by comparison look like clear-cut candidates for sustained international efforts to improve the quality of the electoral process specifically. Moreover this approach to weakening the legitimacy an autocracy derives from holding elections should be positive also for sustainable democracy later, unlike for instance approaches that rely on eroding a regime's performance legitimacy by the use of sanctions that damage the country's economy. 17 Of course that alone might not bring about alternation in office, and even if it does, the regime might 14 15 remain the same. In contrast autocracies that draw heavily on performance legitimacy seem exceptionally vulnerable to whatever reduces their ability to meet people's needs, wants, and expectations. Perhaps more telling still , they are vulnerable to whatever causes society to believe that the regime cannot or soon will prove unable to meet people's needs, wants, and aspirations such as in the event of a major 'exogenous shock'. These scenarios may not be of much concern to those autocracies that today are benefiting handsomely from globalising economic trends which lie outside the power of governments in the West to control. Thus for instance winners in the Gulf from recent dramatic hikes in the internationally traded price of oil and natural gas exemplify the political version of a 'resource curse'. A more contentious example would be President Chávez' Venezuela. But the same situation need not apply to states whose governments are heavily underwritten by international aid.
In oil-importing autocracies and especially the more aid-dependent, then, Where, in contrast, the performance legitimacy of an autocracy rests on its claimed ability to secure order and stability in society rather than prosperity, much could depend on society's willingness to believe that neither the process of autocratic opening nor the political situation that would be most likely to succeed it (weak government, for example) will jeopardise these valuable properties. The degree to which there really is a widespread 'fear of freedom' (or in the case of vulnerable minorities, fears about increased scope for injurious discrimination following a movement towards majoritarian democracy) will depend in part on whether the society is reasonably homogenous. The past record and historical memory of civil peace or sub-state violence will be influential too. The degree of empathy with other 21 The absence of a democratic culture among the mass of society might not prevent autocratic opening by a regime, but it would certainly obstruct democratisation's progress further on.
Similarly the complete absence of true democratic convictions among the political elite need not mean there is no hope of autocratic opening: 'nondemocratic actors, with nowhere else to turn, may seek negotiated, second-best solutions to contingent dilemmas that thrust them unwittingly on the path to democratic practice'. 22 But an absence of liberal democratic convictions among both elite and mass looks very unpromising indeed, even if outside actors do tilt the incentive structure in favour of making some limited opening. Readers are invited to make their own estimates of which and how many countries fit this category.
The United Nations currently has no legal right to use force to impose democracy, even if it were logically and practically possible for democracy to be In the end that might not be necessary, however. For even where an autocracy has virtually no legitimacy and is maintained largely by force and fear, society's potential to make a difference through non-violent resistance and protest should not be underestimated either. 24 In these circumstances the extension of non-violent support by the international community to non-violent strategies of opposition to autocracy within a country are harder to label as illegitimate manifestations of a new imperialism. At least the autocracy's claims to legitimacy might be revealed for what they really are -threadbare -where not only does domestic opposition to the regime exist but the only way the regime feels able to respond is by increase of repression.
And in some cases sound legal pretext may exist to at least bring autocratic (former) leaders to account under international conventions such as those that outlaw war crimes, crimes against humanity or more specific crimes such as torture, if the state is signature to some relevant international treaty.
Conclusion
That autocracies or hard authoritarian regimes vary in how they go about 'systems maintenance' is a fact that extends to the legitmating claims they employ -with 20 21 varying degrees of success -so as to avoid undue reliance on physical repression.
Because these different claims are not all vulnerable in the same degree or in similar ways, actors in the international community who see it as their role to promote autocratic opening to democracy are presented with choices over how to proceed.
From among the several possible resources of power and influence they can call upon, some approaches or combinations of instruments will have potentially more relevance than others, depending on which autocracies are identified and their legitimating properties. For autocracies that dispense with all claims to authority the analysis presented here would appear to have no relevance, leaving hard power as the most obvious approach. But that certainly cannot guarantee opening to democracy and moreover except in special circumstances the use of force has legal and legitimacy problems of its own. Where domestic claims to legitimacy furnish some support for a regime the democracy promotion actors outside would do well to take the distinctive claims and their vulnerabilities into account, when devising their strategies. Where a regime's claims to legitimacy draw on different sources or the substance of their claims changes over time, then a combination of approaches would seem to be indicated, and some attention should be paid to the sequencing too. 
